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covariances of their returns with output growth and inflation. We then explore how the 
relevant covariances and thus the optimal choice of debt instruments depend on the monetary 
regime and on Central Bank preferences for output stabilization, inflation control and interest-
rate smoothing. Finally, we estimate the composition of public debt that would have 
supported debt stabilization in OECD countries over the last two decades. The empirical 
evidence suggests that the public debt should have a long maturity and a large share of it 
should be indexed to the price level. 
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No mention is made of debt management in the debate on debt sustainability, but a care-
ful choice of debt instruments is needed to control interest payments and debt accumulation.
Interest-cost minimization is important especially in countries where the level of debt is high and
interest payments absorb a large share of the budget. In the same countries avoiding the risk that
unfavorable shocks to real returns or output growth lead the debt on an unsustainable path is
equally important.
We want to examine whether a concern for debt sustainability justiﬁes the lengthening of debt
maturity that has occurred in OECD countries. We are also interested in assessing the scope for
inﬂation-indexed bonds that have been issued only in France, Italy, Sweden and the UK while
have been discontinued in the US. To address these issues we rely on a simple model in which debt
management stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio in face of shocks to real returns and GDP growth
and thus supports ﬁscal restraint in ensuring sustainability.
The optimal debt composition is derived by looking at the relative impact of the risk and
cost of alternative debt instruments on the cost of missing the stabilization target. This allows
to price risk against the expected cost of debt service and thus to ﬁnd the optimal combination
along the trade oﬀ between cost and risk minimization. The optimal debt structure is a function
of the expected return diﬀerentials between debt instruments, of the conditional variance of their
returns, and of the conditional covariances of their nominal returns with output growth and
inﬂation.
We show that debt stabilization is achieved by funding at low cost, and by issuing instruments
that provide a hedge against variations in the debt ratio due to lower-than-expected inﬂation and
output growth. For instance, inﬂation-indexed bonds provide a hedge against variations in the
debt ratio due to lower-than-expected inﬂation. Fixed-rate bonds (as opposed to short-term bills)
help to stabilize the debt ratio in cyclical downturns if interest rates and output are negatively
correlated.
We ﬁnd that a stronger ﬁscal reaction to the debt ratio reduces the importance of expected
return diﬀerentials for the choice of the debt instruments. In fact, if debt sustainability is on
average ensured by a restrictive ﬁscal stance, minimizing the expected cost of debt service becomes
less important than avoiding the risk that unfavorable shocks to real returns or output growth
lead the debt on an unsustainable path.
Then, we explore how the relevant covariances between the short-term interest rate, inﬂation
and output growth, and thus the optimal choice of debt instruments, depend on the monetary
regime and on Central Bank preferences for output relative to inﬂation stabilization and interest-
rate smoothing. In particular, we compare the implications for debt management of an inﬂation-
targeting regime with those of a ﬁxed-exchange regime.
Finally, we estimate the composition of public debt that would have supported debt stabi-
lization in OECD countries over the past two decades (not taking into account the implications
of expected cost diﬀerentials). We estimate the conditional covariances between output growth,
inﬂation, and the short-term interest rate using the residuals of forecasting regressions run on
yearly data for the period 1960 to 2003. The empirical evidence suggests that, a part from cost
2considerations, the public debt should have a long maturity and a large share of it should be
indexed to the price level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model of debt stabilization
that trades oﬀ cost and risk minimization. Then, the optimal debt composition is derived in
Section 3 as a function of the risk premia on government bonds and the stochastic relations
between output growth, inﬂation and the interest rate. Section 4 examines the implications for
debt management of alternative monetary regimes. Section 5 presents estimates of the stabilizing
debt structure for OECD countries. Section 6 concludes.
2. The government problem
In this section we present a simple model where debt management stabilizes the debt ratio
and thus helps to ensure debt sustainability. Debt stabilization calls for funding at low cost but
also for minimizing the risk of large payments due to unexpected changes in interest rates and
inﬂation. Hence, the choice of debt instruments trades oﬀ the risk and the expected cost of debt
service.
Risk minimization is accomplished by choosing debt instruments which both ensure a low
return variability and provide a hedge against an unexpected economic slowdown (see e.g. Bohn
1990). Reducing the uncertainty of debt returns, for any expected cost of debt service, is valuable
in that it lowers the probability that higher than expected real return and/or lower than expected
output growth set the debt ratio on an unsustainable path.
To provide insurance against variations in the debt ratio due to lower economic growth, public
bonds should be indexed to nominal GDP. However, this would be a costly innovation. Indeed,
a high premium would have to be paid: i) for insurance; ii) for the illiquidity of the market and;
iii) for the delay in the release of GDP data and their revisions. Therefore, we focus on three
main funding instruments currently available to OECD governments: short-term bills (or ﬂoating
rate notes), ﬁxed-rate long-term bonds and inﬂation-indexed bonds. We do not consider debt
denominated in foreign currency as these instruments are no longer issued by EU governments
since the start of the EMU (see Favero et al. 2000).
To examine the role of short- and long-term debt we consider a two period model. Over a two
period horizon public debt accumulation is approximately equal to
Bt+1 =( 1+Xt+1 + Xt)Bt−1 − St (1)
where Bt+1 is the debt-to-GDP ratio, St is the primary surplus (relative to GDP) decided at time
t for time t+1andXt+1 is the real rate of return on public debt minus the rate of output growth:
Xt+1 = It+1 − πd
t+1 − yt+1 (2)
where It+1 is the nominal rate of return, πd
t+1 i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation measured by the GDP deﬂator
and yt+1 i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fG D P .
In order to ensure a sustainable debt, we assume that the government chooses the primary
surplus as an increasing function of the debt ratio:
SP
t = θBt−1 +( Xt − Et−1Xt)Bt−1 (3)
Therefore, the government not only reacts to a higher debt ratio as in Bohn (1998), but it
also oﬀsets the increase in the debt ratio due to a higher-than-expected real return net of output
3growth. The idea is that the government tends to correct a rise in the debt ratio due to past
unfavorable shocks such as unexpectedly high returns or low output growth.
Substituting the ﬁscal rule (3) in equation (1), the change in the debt ratio over the two
periods is equal to
Bt+1 − Bt−1 =( Et−1Xt+1 + Et−1Xt − θ)Bt−1 +( Xt+1 − Et−1Xt+1)Bt−1 (4)
Equation (4) shows that, even if the primary surplus is expected to stabilize the debt ratio,
so that (Et−1Xt+1 +Et−1Xt −θ)Bt−1 < 0, in general, θ might not be high enough to prevent the
debt ratio from rising if the real return on debt turns out to be particularly high or the growth
rate of GDP particularly low. In particular, if such shocks are permanent the debt ratio may not
be stationary. Quoting Bohn (1998): a suﬃciently high θ can ”keep the debt-to-GDP stationary
in the future unless interest rates and growth rates move very unfavorably”. In the present model
the debt ratio may indeed rise either because of shocks to real interest rates and/or to output
growth.
The two terms on the right-hand-side of equation (4) show that the role of debt management
in ensuring debt sustainability is twofold. Debt instruments can be chosen either to reduce the
expected real return on public debt or to minimize the impact of unfavorable shocks such as
unexpectedly high returns or low output growth.
We assume that the government chooses the composition of the debt to stabilize the debt
ratio and that deviations above the stabilization target, here set equal to Bt−1 for simplicity, are
increasingly costly. Hence, at time t − 1 the government minimizes the following quadratic loss1
L = mEt−1(Bt+1 − Bt−1)+
w
2
Et−1(Bt+1 − Bt−1)2 (5)
with m + w(Bt+1 − Bt−1) ≥ 0.2
There are at least three reasons why the minimization of equation (5) is a sensible objective.
First, even a rigorous ﬁscal rule may not prevent that an unexpected economic slowdown leads
the debt ratio onto an unsustainable path. Second, an increase in the debt ratio, according to
the ﬁscal rule (3), requires a revision in the government budget; i.e. a higher primary surplus
has to be planned for the following year. Such revisions are costly either because of distortionary
taxation or because of political reasons. Third, unlike debt sustainability, debt stabilization is
a visible, well deﬁned and politically relevant goal. Therefore, there are economic, political and
practical reasons as to why the government eﬀorts are in general directed at preventing a rise in
the debt ratio rather than at ensuring that the intertemporal budget constraint holds.
Debt stabilization can be pursued by a combination of policies regarding the choice of primary
surpluses and the choice of debt instruments. In what follows we take the choice of θ as given
1The analysis can be extended to the case the debt ratio must not exceed a given
threshold. In a previous version of the paper the government was assumed to minimize the probability that the
debt ratio exceeded Bt−1, but the assumption of a constant penalty independent of the deviation from the target
can be hardly justiﬁed except when debt stabilization is a priority as in Brazil (see Missale and Giavazzi 2004).
Moreover, if maximizing the probability of debt stabilization is the only objective of the government this provides
an incentive for debt contingent (or derivative) schemes that raise the probability of success in exchange for large
payments and thus larger debt deviations in the case of failure. We are indebted to Adam Posen and Henning Bohn
for raising these points.
2This is the standard assumption with the quadratic utility function that avoids the consideration of losses from
large negative deviation from the target.
4and focus on the role of debt management. The government can choose between short-term
bills (or ﬂoating-rate notes), inﬂation-indexed bonds and ﬁxed-rate long-term bonds. We take
the time period as corresponding to one year and assume that short-term bills have a one-year
maturity while bonds have a two-year maturity. Focusing on a two-year horizon is obviously a
rough approximation given that both inﬂation-indexed bonds and ﬁxed-rate bonds are issued with
much longer maturities. A partial justiﬁcation for this assumption is provided by the monetary
policy model presented in the following section, in which the eﬀects of economic shocks last only
two periods.
The composition of the debt chosen at the end of period t−1a ﬀects the nominal rate of return
between time t and t +1 ,It+1,a sf o l l o w s
It+1 = its +( RI
t−1 + πt+1)h + Rt−1(1 − s − h)( 6 )
where s is the share of short-term debt, h is the share of inﬂation-indexed debt, πt+1 is CPI
inﬂation and it denotes the short-term interest rate between period t and t+1, which determines
the nominal rate of return on one-year bills. The interest rate it is not known at time t−1w h e n
the composition of the debt is chosen. The nominal return on ﬁxed-rate bonds is equal to the
long-term interest rate at which ﬁxed-rate bonds are issued, Rt−1, and is thus known at time
t − 1. Finally, the nominal rate of return on inﬂation-indexed bonds is equal to the sum of the
real interest rate, RI
t−1, known at the time of issuance, and the rate of CPI inﬂation, πt+1,t o
which the bonds are indexed.
3 .T h ec h o i c eo fd e b tm a t u r i t ya n di n d e x a t i o n
The Treasury chooses the composition of the debt at time t−1, and thus s and h, to minimize
the expected loss function (5) subject to equations (4), (2) and (6).
The ﬁrst order conditions are equal to
Et−1(it + it−1 − 2Rt−1)[m + w(Bt+1 − Bt−1)] = 0 (7)
Et−1(2RI
t−1 + πt+1 + Et−1πt − 2Rt−1)[m + w(Bt+1 − Bt−1)] = 0 (8)
Equations (7) and (8) show that the debt structure is optimal only if the marginal cost of a
debt increase, that is associated with the interest cost of additional funding in a particular type of
debt, is equalized across debt instruments. If this were not the case, the government could reduce
its loss by changing the debt structure; e.g. by substituting ﬁxed-rate bonds for short-term bills
or vice versa.3
To gain further intuition the diﬀerence between the nominal rate of return on short-term bills
and ﬁxed-rate bonds can be written as
it + it−1 − 2Rt−1 = it − Et−1it − TPt−1 (9)
where TPt−1 is (two times) the term premium on long-term ﬁxed-rate bonds.
Therefore the expected cost of funding with short-term bills is lower than ﬁxed-rate bonds
because of the term premium but, ex-post, the cost may be greater if the short-term rate turns
out to be higher than expected.
3The argument assumes that there are non-negative constraints to the choice of debt instruments.
5The diﬀerence between the nominal rate of return on price-indexed bonds and ﬁxed-rate bonds
is equal to
2RI
t−1 + πt+1 + Et−1πt − 2Rt−1 = πt+1 − Et−1πt+1 − IPt−1 (10)
where IPt−1 is (two times) the inﬂation risk premium.
Substituting the return diﬀerentials (9) and (10) in the ﬁrst order conditions (7) and (8) yields
Et−1(it − Et−1it)[m + w(Bt+1 − Bt−1)] = TPt−1Et−1[m + w(Bt+1 − Bt−1)] (11)
Et−1(πt+1 − Et−1πt+1)[m + w(Bt+1 − Bt−1)] = IPt−1Et−1[m + w(Bt+1 − Bt−1)] (12)
Equations (11) and (12) show the trade oﬀ between the risk and expected cost of debt service
that characterizes the choice of debt instruments. For instance, equation (11) shows that issuing
short-term bills is optimal until the uncertainty of their return is expected to raise the marginal
cost of deviating from the stabilization target as much as paying the term premium on ﬁxed-rate
bonds. The expected marginal gain of reducing the cost of debt servicing by issuing short-term
bills must be equal to the marginal cost of deviating from the stabilization target because of the
greater risk exposure. Hence, the marginal cost of deviating from the stabilization target can be
used to price risk against the expected cost of debt service and thus ﬁnd the optimal combination
along the trade oﬀ between cost and risk minimization.
Substituting equations (4), (2) and (6) in the ﬁrst order conditions (11) and (12) yields the











































where Va r t−1(.)a n dCovt−1(.) denote variances and covariances conditional on the information
available at time t−1a n d( θ −X)Bt−1 = θBt−1 −[2Rt−1 −Et−1(yt+1 +yt +πd
t+1 +πd
t )]Bt−1 > 0
is the expected reduction of the debt ratio when all the debt is ﬁnanced with ﬁxed-rate long-term
bonds.
The optimal debt shares, s∗ and h∗, depend on both risk and cost considerations. Risk is
minimized if a debt instrument provides insurance against variations in the debt ratio due to
output and inﬂation uncertainty, and if the conditional variance of its returns is relatively low.
This is captured by the ﬁrst two terms in equations (13) and (14).
Equation (13) shows that short-term debt is optimal for risk minimization if the short-term
interest rate and thus the interest payments are positively correlated with unanticipated output
growth and inﬂation. To pay low interests when output growth and inﬂation are unexpectedly
low is valuable because slow nominal growth increases the debt ratio. Instruments with returns
6correlated to nominal output growth help to stabilize the debt ratio, thus reducing the risk that it
will grow above target. On the other hand, the case for short-term debt weakens as the conditional
variance of the short-term interest rate increases, thus producing unnecessary ﬂuctuations in
interest payments. The ﬁrst two terms in equation (13) also decrease with the term premium
because a higher premium reduces the insurance motivation for the choice of short-term debt.
Equation (14) shows that the optimal share of inﬂation-indexed debt increases with the covari-
ance between output growth and inﬂation. If this covariance is positive, lower interest payments
on inﬂation-indexed debt provide an insurance against unexpected slowdowns in economic activ-
ity that raise the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, some inﬂation-indexed debt would be optimal
even if the covariance between output and inﬂation were zero. The reason is that CPI indexation
provides a good hedge against an increase in the debt ratio due to lower than expected GDP
inﬂation. On the other hand a higher inﬂation volatility or a higher inﬂation-risk premium reduce
the importance of insurance motivations for the choice of inﬂation-indexed bonds.
Risk minimization also depends on the conditional covariances between the returns on the
various debt instruments. For instance, a positive covariance between the returns of two types of
debt makes the two instruments substitutes in the government portfolio. This is captured by the
third term in equations (13) and (14).
Leaving aside cost considerations, the government should choose the debt composition which
oﬀers the best insurance against the risk of deﬂation and low growth. But insurance is costly;
higher expected returns are generally required on hedging instruments, and this leads on average
to greater debt accumulation. Debt stabilization thus implies a trade oﬀ between cost and risk
minimization. The eﬀects of expected return diﬀerentials on the optimal debt composition are
captured by the last two terms of equations (13) and (14).
The third term shows that the optimal share of short-term debt and inﬂation-indexed debt
decreases with the risk premium of the other type of debt. The last term in equation (13) shows
that a higher term premium TPt−1, namely a lower expected return of short-term bills relative to
ﬁxed-rate bonds, increases the optimal share of short-term debt. A higher inﬂation-risk premium,
IPt−1, does the same with the share of inﬂation-indexed debt. Finally, the impact of the expected
return diﬀerentials on the optimal shares of short-term bills and indexed bonds decreases with
the variance of their returns as this makes the cost advantage of such instruments less important.
More important, the impact of the expected cost diﬀerentials, TPt−1 and IPt−1, depends on
the expected reduction of the debt ratio (θ − X)Bt−1.A s t r o n g e r ﬁscal reaction to the debt
ratio, θ, clearly reduces the importance of the expected return diﬀerentials for the choice of
debt instruments. Intuitively, as debt sustainability is on average ensured by a restrictive ﬁscal
stance, cost considerations become less important than insurance motivations for the choice of debt
instruments. In other words, if debt stabilization may fail only for large unfavorable realizations of
real returns or output growth, then debt management should be mostly concerned with providing
insurance against such events. This result possibly explains why in countries where the dynamics
of the debt is out of control interest-cost minimization is the main goal of debt management.
The optimal debt composition depends on both risk and cost considerations. In the following
sections, we focus on insurance considerations and, building on the intuition in Bohn (1988),
investigate the role of monetary policy in determining the stochastic structure of the economy
and thus the optimal debt composition.
74. Monetary policy and debt management
The stochastic relations between output, inﬂation and the short-term interest rate depend on
the reaction of the monetary authority to macroeconomic shocks aﬀecting the economy. Therefore,
the monetary regime should play an important role in the choice of debt maturity and indexation.
In this section we rely on a simple aggregate demand and supply model to examine the
implications of alternative monetary regimes for the choice of debt instruments.
The supply side of the economy is modeled as a backward looking Phillips curve:
πt+1 = πt + cyt+1 + ut+1 (15)
where c measures the impact of the output gap, yt+1,o ni n ﬂation πt+1.I n ﬂation is aﬀected by
an i.i.d. supply shock, ut, with mean zero and variance equal to σ2
u.
Equation (15) implies important nominal rigidities and backward looking behavior in that
current inﬂation entirely depends on lagged inﬂation as opposed to expected inﬂation, but its
empirical performance is satisfactorily (see Fuhrer 1997).
The aggregate demand is equal to
yt+1 = ρyt − a(it − Etπt+1 − ¯ r)+vt+1 (16)
where it − Etπt+1 is the real interest rate between period t and t + 1. The impact of the interest
rate depends on the parameter a,w h i l eρ measures output auto-correlation. Finally, vt+1 is an
i.i.d. demand shock with mean zero and variance equal to σ2
v.
The Central Bank controls aggregate demand and thus output and inﬂation with a lag through
the choice of the nominal interest rate, it set at the beginning of period t.
4.1 Inﬂation targeting
In an inﬂation-targeting regime the Central Bank aims at maintaining expected inﬂation close
to the target and, possibly, at stabilizing output. Then, assuming a concern for interest-rate
volatility, the loss function of the Central Bank is equal to
LIT = Et(πt+1 − πT)2 + λEty2
t+1 + α(it − it−1)2 (17)
where πT is the inﬂation target, and λ and α are the (publicly known) weights given by the
Central Bank to output stabilization and interest-rate smoothing relative to the inﬂation target.
The Central Bank chooses the short-term interest rate, it, to minimize the loss function (17)
subject to equations (16) and (15). The interest rate rule is, thus, equal to










a2c2 + a2λ + α(1 − ac)2
and where ac < 1 ensures that an increase in the interest rate reduces the inﬂation rate. Hence,
the reaction to current inﬂation is greater than one, β > 1, and decreases with the weight, λ,
assigned to output stabilization. Finally, the degree of interest-rate smoothing is captured by µ
which is increasing in α.
8The interest rate rule (17) can be combined with the aggregate demand (16) and the aggregate
supply (15) to derive the conditional covariances between output, inﬂation and the interest rate.
In what follows we examine how such covariances are aﬀected by the preferences of the Central
Bank regarding output stabilization and interest rate smoothing.
4.1.1 Inﬂation targeting and debt management
Monetary policy aﬀects the conditional covariances between output, inﬂation and the interest
rate that determine the optimal composition of public debt. The (two-period ahead) unanticipated
components of inﬂation, output and the interest rate are equal to
πt+1 − Et−1πt+1 =
λ
c2 + λ
(πt − Et−1πt)+µzc[β(πt − Et−1πt)+γ(yt − Et−1yt)] + ut+1 + cvt+1 (19)
yt+1 − Et−1yt+1 = −
c
c2 + λ
(πt − Et−1πt)+µz[β(πt − Et−1πt)+γ(yt − Et−1yt)] + vt+1 (20)
it − Et−1it =( 1 − µ)[β(πt − Et−1πt)+γ(yt − Et−1yt)] (21)
where z = a/(1 − ac) > 0.
Noting that Va r t−1(πt)=c2σ2
v + σ2
u, Va r t−1(yt)=σ2
v and Covt−1(ytπt)=cσ2
v,w ed e r i v et h e



























































The correlation coeﬃcients in equations (22), (23) and (24) determine the composition of
public debt that oﬀers the best insurance against the risk of deﬂation and low growth, namely
when expected return diﬀerentials are not taken into account.
To examine these correlations it is useful to leave aside interest-rate smoothing for a moment;
i.e. to assume µ = 0. In this case, the conditional covariance between output and the interest rate
in equation (22) is always negative because the interest rate lowers inﬂation through a contraction
of aggregate demand. This negative correlation decreases with λ because a more ﬂexible inﬂation
targeting implies a weaker reaction of the interest rate to inﬂationary pressure.
The conditional covariance between the interest rate and inﬂation in equation (23) depends
on the weight λ that the monetary authority assigns to output stabilization. In a strict inﬂation
targeting, i.e. with λ = 0, this covariance is zero since inﬂation may diﬀer from its expectation
9two periods earlier only because of contemporaneous shocks (see equation (19)). Intuitively, if
the control of inﬂation is the only objective of monetary policy, then inﬂation is expected to
be uncorrelated with the policy instrument, it. On the other hand, if the authorities also care
about output stabilization, i.e. if λ > 0, the interest-rate reaction does not eliminate inﬂationary
pressures and the covariance between inﬂation and the interest rate is positive. Therefore, in the
absence of interest-rate smoothing, a role for short-term debt emerges only if λ >c ,t h a ti s ,o n l y
if the monetary authority cares suﬃciently about output stabilization.
Focusing on the choice of inﬂation-indexed debt, we observe that the correlation coeﬃcient in
equation (24) is positive for λ = 0, it increases with the variance of demand shocks relative to the
variance of supply shocks, and decreases with λ. The intuition for these results is as follows. The
conditional covariance between output and inﬂation depends on demand and supply shocks oc-
curring at time t+1 and on the correlation induced by monetary policy. Contemporaneous shocks
lead to a positive covariance that increases with the variance of demand relative to supply shocks.
The eﬀect of monetary policy depends instead on the weight assigned to output stabilization. In
as t r i c ti n ﬂation targeting, with λ = 0, unanticipated inﬂation only depends on contemporaneous
shocks and the policy eﬀect vanishes. In a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting the authorities give up in-
ﬂation stability and this induces a negative covariance between output and inﬂation. As a result,
the overall covariance decreases and may turn out to be negative for a high weight λ, assigned
to output stabilization. A higher inﬂation volatility also reduces the correlation coeﬃcient in
equation (24).
To conclude, in the absence of interest-rate smoothing, there is little or no role for short-term
debt. In particular, if the monetary authority only aims at controlling inﬂation, the debt should
either have a long maturity or be indexed to the inﬂation rate. As implied by tax-smoothing, the
optimal share of indexed debt increases with the variance of demand relative to supply shocks
(see Missale 1997). On the other hand, if the monetary authority also aims at stabilizing output,
then a lower share of inﬂation-indexed debt is needed to stabilize the debt ratio and a role for
short-term debt may emerge.
4.1.2 Debt management and Central Bank preferences
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the preferences of the Central Bank, in
particular, the weight, λ, assigned to output stabilization plays an important role for the choice
of debt instruments (for given expected return diﬀerentials). A concern for output stabilization
unambiguously favors short-term debt while the optimal shares of long-term debt and inﬂation-
indexed debt are greater the ”more conservative” is the Central Bank in its anti-inﬂationary
policy. It is worth noting that these results are not aﬀected by the consideration of interest-rate
smoothing.
The result that a higher share of debt should be indexed to the price level when the monetary
authority strictly control inﬂation is interesting in that it reverses the implications of the time-
consistency literature that inﬂation-indexed debt helps the monetary authority to control inﬂation
by reducing the incentive to inﬂate.
The analysis also provides insights in how the optimal debt structure may have changed for
countries joining the EMU, as policy making moved from national central banks to the European
Central Bank (ECB). If the ECB were less concerned with output ﬂuctuations than the national
authorities, then, everything else being equal, the optimal policy would call for lengthening the
10maturity of the debt and issuing inﬂa t i o ni n d e x e dd e b t .
4.1.3 Interest rate smoothing
In this section we relax the assumption that µ = 0 to focus on the implications of interest-rate
smoothing. Equations (23) shows that the correlation coeﬃcient between the short-term interest
rate and next period inﬂation increases with the degree of interest-rate smoothing, µ.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
a concern for interest rate volatility weakens the short-run reaction of the monetary authority
to inﬂationary pressure and leads to a lower variance of the interest rate. More important, as
next period inﬂation is not fully stabilized, current inﬂationary shocks tend to persist, and this
generates a positive covariance between next period inﬂation and the interest rate.
The correlation coeﬃcient between output growth and the interest rate in equation (22) also
increases with the degree of interest-rate smoothing. This is because the impact on output is lower
the weaker the interest-rate reaction and this reduces the negative covariance between output and
the interest rate.
Hence interest-rate smoothing favors short-term debt besides cost considerations. Short-term
debt may even be optimal for insurance if the positive correlation of the interest rate with inﬂation
prevails over the negative correlation with output, which may happen for a suﬃciently high λ and
µ.
The eﬀect of interest-rate smoothing on the correlation coeﬃcient between output and in-
ﬂation in equation (24) is ambiguous and so are its implications for inﬂation-indexed debt. A
weaker interest-rate reaction leads to higher inﬂation volatility, but its eﬀect on the covariance
between output and inﬂation is non-linear and depends on the weight, λ, assigned to output sta-
bilization. In a strict inﬂation targeting, the covariance between output and inﬂation decreases
because the authorities give up inﬂation stability in exchange for interest-rate stability and this
generates a policy-induced negative covariance between output and inﬂation. However, this eﬀect
is reversed as µ increases and the negative impact on output is reduced. A similar eﬀect arises
in a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, since the policy-induced covariance between output and inﬂation
is negative. Finally, a greater variance of demand relative to supply shock makes it more likely
that interest-rate smoothing reduces the correlation between output and inﬂation, and thus the
need for inﬂation indexed debt.
To conclude, interest-rate smoothing makes a case for short-term debt. In particular, a positive
amount of short-term debt can be optimal for debt stabilization even in a strict inﬂation-targeting
regime, that is, even if the Central Bank does not aim at stabilizing output. In the latter case
short-term debt should be issued in exchange for inﬂation-indexed debt as (some) smoothing
reduces the need for indexation.
4.2 Fixed exchange rate
In a ﬁxed exchange-rate regime the Central Bank maintains the parity by pegging the interest
rate to the interest rate of the leader country possibly augmented by a currency premium. To
the extent that the monetary authority has some ﬂexibility in pursuing domestic stabilization
o b j e c t i v e s ,i t sl o s sf u n c t i o ni se q u a lt o
LFE = Et(πt+1 − πT)2 + λEty2
t+1 + ε(it − i∗
t − Pet)2 (25)
where Pet denotes the currency premium, that is, the sum of expected depreciation, the country
11risk premium and the foreign-exchange premium. Finally, ε is the weight given by the Central
Bank to the objective of maintaining the exchange rate ﬁxed.
To simplify the analysis we assume that the exchange rate and foreign output do not aﬀect
domestic demand and thus that the structure of the domestic economy is still represented by
equations (15) and (16).
T h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l ei naﬁxed exchange regime is derived by minimizing the loss function
(25) subject to (15) and (16), and is equal to
it = η(i∗
t + Pet)+( 1− η)[πT +¯ r + β(πt − πT)+γyt] (26)
where η is an increasing function of ε and captures the extent of interest-rate pegging.
Assuming that the monetary authority of the leader country sets the interest rate to stabilize
foreign inﬂation and output; i.e. i∗
t = πT∗ +¯ r∗ + β∗(π∗
t − πT∗)+γ∗y∗
t, the domestic interest rate
rule is equal to
it = η[Pet + πT∗ +¯ r∗ + β∗(π∗
t − πT∗)+γ∗y∗
t]+( 1− η)[πT +¯ r + β(πt − πT)+γyt] (27)
The interest rate rule (27) can be combined with the aggregate demand (16) and the aggregate
supply (15) to derive the conditional covariances between output, inﬂation and the interest rate.
4.2.1 Fixed exchange rate and debt management
The implications of interest rate pegging for debt management depend on how shocks to the
currency premium and foreign monetary policy aﬀect the conditional covariances between output,
inﬂation and the interest rate. To understand the role of foreign policy it is useful to look at the
unanticipated component of the domestic interest rate that is equal to






where et = Pet − Et−1Pet deﬁnes the unanticipated component of the currency premium due to
shocks to the country risk premium and expected depreciation. We assume that et, has mean
zero, variance equal to σ2
e, and is uncorrelated to supply and demand shocks ut and vt.
Equation (28) shows that the domestic interest rate diﬀers from that prevailing under inﬂation
targeting either because of shocks to the currency premium or because of imported monetary
policy. The latter may diﬀer from the optimal policy under inﬂation targeting for two reasons.
First, the timing and magnitude of foreign demand and supply shocks are, in general, diﬀerent from
those of domestic shocks. Second, the economic structure and thus the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy may vary across countries, as captured by the reaction parameters, β∗ and
γ∗. In what follows we focus on each aspect at a time starting from the eﬀects of shocks to the
currency premium.
4.2.2 Currency premium shocks and debt management
To focus on the eﬀect of shocks to the country risk premium and expected depreciation, we
assume that the domestic and foreign economy are identical and experience the same demand and
supply shocks.
12The (two-period ahead) unanticipated components of inﬂation, output and the interest rate
are equal to
πt+1 − Et−1πt+1 =
λ
c2 + λ
(πt − Et−1πt)+ut+1 + cvt+1 − czηet (29)
yt+1 − Et−1yt+1 = −
c
c2 + λ
(πt − Et−1πt)+vt+1 − zηet (30)
it − Et−1it = ηet +[ β(πt − Et−1πt)+γ(yt − Et−1yt)] (31)
where z = a/(1 − ac) > 0.
Equations (29), (30) and (31) are the same as in an inﬂation targeting regime except for the
shocks to the currency premium. The latter has the same impact on the economy as an interest
rate shock, namely, as a change in interest rate unrelated to supply and demand shocks.
The correlation coeﬃcients of equations (13) and (14) can be derived using (29), (30) and (31)





































Equations (31) and (32) show that the correlation coeﬃcients of output and inﬂation with
the interest rate are lower than the corresponding coeﬃcients under inﬂation targeting. This is
because shocks to the currency premium lead to changes in the interest rate which are unrelated to
demand and supply shocks. Since output and inﬂation fall as the interest rate rises, this generates
a negative covariance of the interest rate with both output and inﬂation.
Therefore shocks to the country risk premium or to expected depreciation make a strong case
against short-term debt; its share should be lower than in an inﬂation-targeting regime.
By contrast inﬂation-indexed debt can provide a partial insurance against shocks of the cur-
rency premium; the correlation coeﬃcient between output and inﬂation in equation (33) is always
higher than the corresponding coeﬃcient under inﬂation targeting.4 This is because changes in
the interest rate make output and inﬂation move in the same direction thus reinforcing the positive
covariance induced by demand shocks. It is, however, worth noting that this result hinges on the
ability of the Central Bank to maintain the exchange rate ﬁxed. If an increase in the country risk
premium triggered a depreciation, then the resulting inﬂation would lead to a negative covariance
with output and thus to the opposite result.
To conclude, countries that experience substantial variations in the interest rate due to shocks
to the currency premium should abstain from short-term funding of public debt and rely on long-






t−1(πt+1) < 1/c is veriﬁed for λ = 0 and thus for any λ.
134.2.3 Imported monetary policy and debt management
To understand the implications for debt management of imported monetary policy it is useful
to focus on the case where the domestic and foreign economy have the same structure but are hit
by diﬀerent shocks. A simple formalization of this hypothesis is to assume that:
u∗
t = kut v∗
t = kvt
By varying the parameter k we can examine the case of: i) greater foreign shocks, k>1; ii)
smaller foreign shocks, 0 <k<1, and; iii) asymmetric shocks, k<0.
Noting that π∗
t −Et−1π∗
t = k(πt−Et−1πt)a n dy∗
t −Et−1y∗
t = k(yt−Et−1yt), the unanticipated
components of inﬂation, output and the interest rate are equal to
πt+1 − Et−1πt+1 =[ 1 − cz(δβ − 1)](πt − Et−1πt)+czγ(1 − δ)(yt − Et−1yt)+ut+1 + cvt+1 (35)
yt+1 − Et−1yt+1 = −z(δβ − 1)(πt − Et−1πt)++ zγ(1 − δ)(yt − Et−1yt)+vt+1 (36)
it − Et−1it = δ[β(πt − Et−1πt)+γ(yt − Et−1yt)] (37)
where δ =1− η + ηk.





































v − z(δβ − 1)[1 − cz(δβ − 1)](c2σ2
v + σ2




u){1+[ 1− cz(δβ − 1)]2} + zγ(1 − δ)[zγ(1 − δ) − 2 − 2cz(δβ − 1)]c2σ2
v
(40)
Equations (38) and (39) can be compared to equations (22) and (23) to show that whether
the correlation coeﬃcients of output and inﬂation with the interest rate are greater or lower than
the corresponding coeﬃcients under inﬂation targeting depends on δ =1− η + ηk.I f0< δ < 1
both coeﬃcients are greater than those under inﬂation targeting and so is the optimal share of
short-term debt. In this case the shocks hitting the foreign economy are smaller than the domestic
shocks (and possibly negatively correlated, −(1 − η)/η <k<1), which implies a reaction by the
foreign Central Bank that is weaker than what would be optimal for the domestic country. On
the contrary, if δ > 1o rδ < 0, both coeﬃcients are smaller than those under inﬂation targeting,
suggesting little or no role for short-term debt in stabilizing the debt ratio. Interestingly, the case
against short-term debt arises either because of greater foreign, k>1, or because of negatively
correlated shocks, k<−(1 − η)/η. In the former case the imported monetary policy leads to a
too strong interest-rate reaction, while in the latter it implies a pro-cyclical reaction.
The implications for inﬂation-indexed debt depend on the correlation between output and
inﬂation in equation (40). Whether this correlation is greater or lower than under inﬂation
targeting, it does not only depend on δ, but also on the values of other parameters and the
variance of demand relative to supply shocks. For instance, in the case λ =0 ,t h ec o r r e l a t i o n
between output and inﬂation is greater than under inﬂation targeting if δ > 1o ri fδ < ¯ δ < 1,
14where ¯ δ can be positive or negative depending on the variance of demand relative to supply shocks.
Hence, the optimal share of inﬂation-indexed debt is greater than under inﬂation targeting for
l a r g es h o c k st ot h ef o r e i g ne c o n o m yl e a d i n gt oat o ostrong interest-rate reaction and in the case
of small or asymmetric foreign shocks implying a pro-cyclical imported monetary policy.
Therefore, diﬀerences in the magnitude and correlation of domestic and foreign shocks in a
ﬁxed exchange regime may favor inﬂation-indexed bonds, and possibly long-term conventional
bonds as stabilizing instruments when the foreign policy reaction is too strong or asymmetric for
domestic stabilization purposes.
4.2.4 Diﬀerent transmission mechanisms and debt management
The results of the previous section hinge on the hypothesis that the structures of the domestic
and foreign economy are the same. In what follows we show how the implications of diﬀerent eco-
nomic structures for the choice of debt instruments can be derived using the framework developed
so far.
A ﬁrst case to consider is when the aggregate demand of the foreign economy is more sensitive
to the interest rate than the domestic demand; i.e. when a∗ >a . If we restrict the analysis to the
case where both monetary authorities do not care about output stabilization, then β∗ =( a/a∗)β
and γ∗ =( a/a∗)γ. Assuming that the two countries experience the same shocks, the interest-rate
reaction is equal to
it − Et−1it = φ[β(πt − Et−1πt)+γ(yt − Et−1yt)] (41)
where φ =( a/a∗)η +( 1− η) < 1.
Because φ < 1 the implications for debt management of a greater sensitivity of the aggregate
demand of the leader country to the interest rate are the same of those derived earlier under the
assumption of a lower variance of foreign shocks. In particular, the optimal share of short-term
debt is higher than under inﬂation targeting because the stronger foreign transmission mechanism
implies a weaker reaction by the foreign Central Bank to the same shocks.
A second case to consider is when foreign inﬂation is less sensitive to the output gap than
domestic inﬂation; i.e. when c∗ <c . If both monetary authorities do not care about output
stabilization, then β∗ =( c/c∗)β and γ∗ = γ. Then, assuming that the two countries experience
the same shocks, the unanticipated component of the interest rate is equal to
it − Et−1it =[¯ β(πt − Et−1πt)+γ(yt − Et−1yt)] (42)
where ¯ β =[ ( c/c∗)η +( 1− η)]β is a weighted average of the foreign and domestic interest-rate
reactions to inﬂation shocks, and thus is greater than the domestic reaction under inﬂation target-
ing, β. This suggests that a lower sensitivity of foreign inﬂation to the output gap has the same
implications for debt management as those derived earlier for a stronger preference of the Central
Bank for inﬂation control relative to output stabilization. In particular, the stronger reaction to
inﬂationary pressure would reduce the optimal share of short-term debt while it would increase
the share of inﬂation-indexed debt.
5. Estimating the optimal debt structure
In this section we estimate the composition of public debt that would have supported debt
stabilization in OECD countries over the past two decades when cost considerations are not taken
15into account, namely when expected return diﬀerentials, TPt−1 and IPt−1 are set to zero. The
debt composition is obtained by estimating the correlation coeﬃcients in equations (13) and (14)
using yearly series of output growth, CPI inﬂation, GDP inﬂation, and the short-term interest
rate for the period 1960-2003.5
The conditional correlation coeﬃcients are obtained in two steps. First, the unanticipated
components of output growth, CPI inﬂation, GDP inﬂation and the short-term interest rate are
estimated as the residuals of forecasting equations in their second lags (in the ﬁrst lag for the
interest rate). Second, the correlation coeﬃcients are obtained as the coeﬃcients of the regressions
of the residuals of output growth and GDP inﬂation on the residuals of the interest rate, and as the
coeﬃcients of the regression of the residuals of output growth and GDP inﬂation on the residuals
of CPI inﬂation. The ﬁrst stage regressions are run recursively using only the information available
up to the time when the forecast is made with a constant window of ﬁfteen years. This implies
that the series of residuals starts in 1976 or 1980, depending on data availability, despite the fact
that the sample period runs from 1960 to 2003.
The estimated coeﬃcients are shown in Table 1; they are remarkably consistent with the
stochastic structure derived from the monetary policy model developed in section 4. As expected,
the correlation coeﬃcients between output growth and the interest rate are negative and sig-
niﬁcant for all countries considered except for Spain and Sweden. The coeﬃcients of inﬂation
on the interest rate, though positive, display a diﬀerent pattern across countries. In Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain and the UK, the hypothesis of no conditional correlation between inﬂation
and the interest rate cannot be rejected at the 5% signiﬁcant level, while in Italy at the 10%
level. The absence of a relation is consistent with strict inﬂation targeting regimes where the
authorities place no weight on output stabilization. All the other countries exhibit instead a sig-
niﬁcant positive correlation between inﬂation and the interest rate. The coeﬃcient is particularly
high for Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the US. This evidence is consistent with monetary
regimes where monetary authorities have a concern for output stabilization and/or interest-rate
smoothing. This evidence is also consistent with a ﬁxed exchange regime when the interest-rate
reaction of the leader countries is weaker than that needed to fully stabilize domestic inﬂation.
The last column of Table 1 shows that the correlation coeﬃcient between output and inﬂation
is negative but not signiﬁcant for all countries considered except for Denmark, France, the UK and
the US. This is also evidence of a preference for output stabilization and interest-rate smoothing
in the conduct of monetary policy.
The estimated coeﬃcients in Table 1 allow us to derive the debt compositions that would have
supported debt stabilization over the past two decades when expected cost considerations are not
taken into account.
The optimal debt compositions are shown in Table 2. Short-term debt should not have been
issued in Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US. These
countries exhibit a signiﬁcant negative correlation between output growth and the interest rate
that is not oﬀset by the positive correlation between inﬂation and the interest rate. This evidence
suggests that short-term debt in these countries had a role in stabilizing the debt ratio only
because of its lower expected return. By contrast, in Ireland, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, in
Belgium short-term debt also had a role in stabilizing the debt ratio against variations in output
5All data are taken from OECD National Accounts and Main Economic Indicators. In the case of Denmark,
Italy, Spain and Sweden we use the long-term interest rate because of the unavailability of suﬃciently long series
for the short-term interest rate.
16growth and inﬂation, because the correlation between inﬂation and the interest rate was high and
signiﬁcant.
Indexation to CPI inﬂation naturally provides insurance against lower-than-expected inﬂation.
The optimal share of inﬂation-indexed debt is particularly high in Belgium, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK where the correlation between output
growth and inﬂation is positive or not signiﬁcant (except for the UK). Thus, insurance consid-
erations suggest a large scope for indexation in these countries in sharp contrast with the little
or no reliance on such bonds by actual debt management. The fact that such bonds have been
issued only in France, Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the US, and often in limited amounts, can be
explained only in part by the cost of introducing such bonds or by their illiquidity.
Finally, a large share of ﬁxed-rate long-term debt should have been issued in Denmark, France,
the Netherlands, and the US where short-term debt played no stabilizing role while the insurance
provided by inﬂation indexation was partly oﬀset by the negative correlation between inﬂation
and output growth. In fact, the actual debt maturity in these countries is among the longest in
the OECD.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model in which debt management stabilizes the debt ratio
in face of shocks to real returns and output growth. Although the model is very simple, it helps
think about the role of debt management in ensuring debt sustainability, a theme that has, so
far, received scant attention in the literature.
The analysis highlights two reasons why the choice of debt instruments is important for debt
sustainability. Debt instruments can be chosen to minimize the expected return on public debt
and thus the rate at which the debt accumulates. But debt instruments can also be chosen to
insulate the debt ratio from unfavorable shocks such as unexpectedly high returns or low output
growth. If such shocks are persistent, they may lead the debt on an unsustainable path. Avoiding
such risk is a crucial task of debt management.
This ﬁnding motivates a further analysis of the stochastic relations between the returns on the
main funding instruments with inﬂation and output growth that aﬀect the dynamics of the debt
ratio. We have investigated the role of short-term bills, ﬁxed-rate bonds and inﬂation-indexed
bonds in providing insurance against lower-than-expected inﬂa t i o na n dG D Pg r o w t hi nO E C D
countries over the past two decades.
The empirical evidence suggests that the public debt should have a long maturity and a large
share of it should be indexed to the price level. Little or no insurance is instead provided by
short-term debt; a role for such instrument in stabilizing the public debt arises only because of
its lower expected return.
Although it is tempting to translate these ﬁndings into policy indications, caution is needed
as the future relevance of the estimated relations is uncertain. Indeed, such relations may reﬂect
the prevalence of particular shocks in the past. Moreover, the estimated optimal compositions do
not take into account the implications of expected cost diﬀerentials. These may in part explain
why OECD governments have so far relied on short-term debt and issued limited amounts of
inﬂation-indexed bonds. However, the estimated optimal share of inﬂation-indexed bonds is so
large that we take this evidence as suggestive of the potential gains that governments could obtain
if they issued such bonds.
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Note: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level. ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level.
a long-term interest rate have been used in the analysis.
Years in parentheses indicate the recursive estimation sample.














Belgium 11 68 21 11 68 21
Denmarka −12 5 107 05 9 5
France −14 28 86 02 8 7 2
Germany 2 77 21 27 7 2 1
Ireland 26 45 29 26 45 29
Italya 0 100 0 0 100 0
Japan −20 77 43 07 7 2 3
Netherlands −32 61 71 06 1 3 9
Spaina −46 86 60 08 6 1 4
Swedena 84 68 -52 55 45 0
UK −33 79 54 06 0 4 0
US −22 24 98 02 4 7 6
Notes: The debt composition is derived from equation (13) and (14) using the coeﬃcients in Table 1.
The constrained debt composition is computed assuming that debt shares can not be negative.
a long-term interest rate has been used to estimate the coeﬃcients in Table 1.
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